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Abstract. A central question for knowledge representation is how to
encode and handle uncertain knowledge adequately. We introduce the
probabilistic description logic ALCP that is designed for representing
context-dependent knowledge, where the actual context taking place is
uncertain. ALCP allows the expression of logical dependencies on the
domain and probabilistic dependencies on the possible contexts. In order
to draw probabilistic conclusions, we employ the principle of maximum
entropy. We provide reasoning algorithms for this logic, and show that
it satisfies several desirable properties of probabilistic logics.
1 Introduction
A fundamental element of any intelligent application is storing and manipulat-
ing the knowledge from the application domain. Logic-based knowledge repre-
sentation languages such as description logics (DLs) [1] provide a clear syntax
and unambiguous semantics that guarantee the correctness of the results ob-
tained. However, languages based on classical logic are ill-suited for handling
the uncertainty inherent to many application domains. To overcome this limi-
tation, various probabilistic logics have been investigated during the last three
decades (e.g., [3, 15, 20]). In particular, several probabilistic DLs have been de-
veloped [18, 19]. To handle probabilistic knowledge, many approaches require a
complete definition of joint probability distributions (JPD) [5, 6, 8, 16, 25]. One
approach to avoid a full JPD specification was proposed by Paris [22]: the user
gives a partial specification through a set of probabilistic constraints and the
partial knowledge is completed by means of the principle of maximum entropy.
In this paper we consider a new probabilistic extension of description logics
based on the principle of maximum entropy. In our approach we group differ-
ent axioms from a knowledge base together into so-called contexts, which are
identified by a propositional formula. Intuitively, each context corresponds to a
possible situation, in which the associated sub-KB is guaranteed to hold. Un-
certainty is associated to the contexts through a set of probabilistic constraints,
which are interpreted under the principle of maximum entropy.
To facilitate the understanding of our approach, we focus on the DL ALC [26]
as a prototypical example of a knowledge representation language, and propo-
sitional probabilistic constraints as the framework for expressing uncertainty.
As reasoning service we consider subsumption relations between concepts given
some partial knowledge of the current context. Since the knowledge in a knowl-
edge base is typically incomplete, one cannot expect to obtain a precise probabil-
ity for a given consequence. Instead, we compute a belief interval that describes
all the probability degrees that can be associated to the consequence without
contradiction. The lowest bound of the interval corresponds to a sceptical view,
considering only the most fundamental models of the knowledge base. The upper
bound, in contrast, reflects the credulous belief in which every context that is
not explicitly removed is considered. In the worst-case, we get the trivial inter-
val [0, 1], in the best case, we get a point probability where the upper and lower
bounds coincide. In some applications, it might be reasonable to consider only
one of these bounds. For instance, if the probability interval that a treatment
will cause heavy complications is [0.01, 0.05], we might want to use the upper
bound 0.05. In contrast, when the probability interval that a treatment will be
successful is [0.7, 0.9], we might be more interested in the lower bound 0.7.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
– we define the new probabilistic description logic ALCP that allows for a
flexible description of axiomatic dependencies, and its reasoning problems
(Section 3);
– we explain in detail how degrees of belief for the subsumption problem can
be computed (Section 4); and
– we show that ALCP satisfies several desirable properties of probabilistic
logics (Section 5).
2 Maximum Entropy
We start by recalling the basic notions of probabilistic propositional logic and
the principle of maximum entropy.
Let L be a propositional language constructed over a finite signature sig(L),
i.e., a set of propositional variables, in the usual way. An L-interpretation v is a
truth assignment of the propositional variables in sig(L). Int(L) denotes the set of
all L-interpretations. Satisfaction of a formula φ ∈ L by an L-interpretation v ∈
Int(L) (denoted v |= φ) is defined as usual. A probability distribution over L is a
function P : Int(L)→ [0, 1] where
∑
v∈Int(L) P (v) = 1. Probability distributions
are extended to arbitrary L-formulas φ by setting P (φ) =
∑
v|=φ P (v).
Definition 1 (probabilistic constraints, models). Given the propositional
language L, a probabilistic constraint (over L) is an expression of the form
c0 +
k∑
i=1
ci · p(φi) ≥ 0 (1)
where c0, ci ∈ R, and φi ∈ L, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. A probability distribution P over L
is a model of the probabilistic constraint c0 +
∑k
i=1 ci · p(φi) ≥ 0 if and only if
c0+
∑k
i=1 ci ·P (φi) ≥ 0. The distribution P is a model of the set of probabilistic
contraints R (P |= R) iff it satisfies all the constraints in R. The set of all
models of R is denoted by Mod(R). If Mod(R) 6= ∅, we say that R is consistent.
Our probabilistic constraints can express the most common types of constraints
considered in the literature of probabilistic logics. For instance, probabilistic
conditionals (ψ | φ)[ℓ, u] are satisfied iff ℓ · P (φ) ≤ P (ψ ∧ φ) ≤ u · P (φ) [17].
That is, the conditional is satisfied iff the conditional probability of ψ given φ
is between ℓ and u whenever P (φ) > 0. Sometimes P (φ) > 0 is demanded, but
strict inequalities are computationally difficult and the semantical differences
are negligible in many cases, see [24] for a thorough discussion. These conditions
can be expressed in the form (1) as follows
p(ψ ∧ φ)− ℓ · p(φ) ≥ 0, and
u · p(φ)− p(ψ ∧ φ) ≥ 0.
Probabilistic constraints can also express more complex restrictions; for example,
we can state that the probability that a bird cannot fly is at most one fourth of
the probability that a bird flies through the constraint
1
4
p(bird ∧ flies)− p(bird ∧ ¬flies) ≥ 0. (2)
To improve readability, we will often rewrite constraints in a more compact
manner, using conditionals as in the first example, or e.g. rewriting (2) as
1
4p(bird ∧ flies) ≥ p(bird ∧ ¬flies).
In general, consistent sets of probabilistic constraints have infinitely many
models, and there is no obvious way to distinguish between them. One well-
studied approach for dealing with this diversity is to focus on the model that
maximizes the entropy
H(P ) = −
∑
v∈Int(L)
P (v) · logP (v).
From an information-theoretic point of view, the maximum entropy (ME) dis-
tribution can be regarded as the most conservative one in the sense that it
minimizes the information-theoretic distance (that is, the KL-divergence) to the
uniform distribution among all probability distributions that satisfy our con-
straints. In particular, if there are no restrictions on the probability distributions
considered, then the uniform distribution is the ME distribution, see, e.g., [27]
for a more detailed discussion of these issues. A complete characterization of
maximum entropy for the purpose of uncertain reasoning can be found in [22].
Definition 2 (ME-model). Let R be a consistent set of probabilistic con-
straints. The ME-model PMER of R is the unique solution of the maximization
problem argmaxP |=RH(P ).
Existence and uniqueness of PMER follows from the fact that H is strictly concave
and continuous, and that the probability distributions that satisfy R form a
compact and convex set. PMER is usually computed by deriving an unconstrained
optimization problem by means of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The
resulting problem can be solved, for instance, by (quasi-)Newton methods with
cost |Int(L)|3, see, e.g., [21] for more details on these techniques.
3 The Probabilistic Description Logic ALCP
ALCP is a probabilistic extension of the classical description logic ALC capable
of expressing complex logical and probabilistic relations. As with classical DLs,
the main building blocks in ALCP are concepts. Syntactically, ALCP concepts
are constructed exactly as ALC concepts. Given two disjoint sets NC of concept
names and NR of role names, ALCP concepts are built using the grammar rule
C ::= A | ¬C | C ⊓ C | ∃r.C, where A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. Note that we can
derive disjunction, universal quantification and subsumption from these rules
by using logical equivalences like C1 ⊔ C2 ≡ ¬(¬C1 ⊓ ¬C2). The knowledge of
the application domain is expressed through a finite set of axioms that restrict
the way the different concepts and roles may be interpreted. To express both
probabilistic and logical relationships, each axiom is annotated with a formula
from L that intuitively expresses the context in which this axiom holds.
Definition 3 (KB). An L-restricted general concept inclusion (L-GCI) is of
the form 〈C ⊑ D : κ〉 where C,D are ALCP concepts and κ is an L-formula.
An L-TBox is a finite set of L-GCIs. An ALCP knowledge base (KB) over L
is a pair K = (R, T ) where R is a set of probabilistic constraints and T is an
L-TBox.
Example 4. Consider an application modeling beliefs about bacterial and viral
infections using the concept names strep (streptococcal infection), bac (bacterial
infection), vir (viral infection), inf (infection), and ab (antibiotic); and the role
names sf (suffers from), and suc (successful treatment); and the propositional
variables res (antibiotic resistance), and h (heavy use of antibiotics by patient).
Define the L-TBox Texa containing the L-GCIs
〈∃sf.bac ⊑ ∃suc.ab : ¬res∧¬h〉, 〈∃sf.vir ⊑ ¬∃suc.ab : ⊤〉 , 〈strep ⊑ bac : ⊤〉 ,
〈∃sf.bac ⊑ ¬∃suc.ab : res〉, 〈bac ⊑ inf : ⊤〉, 〈vir ⊑ inf : ⊤〉 ,
where ⊤ is any L-tautology. For example, the first L-GCI states that a bacterial
infection can be treated successfully with antibiotics if no antibiotic resistance
is present and there was no heavy use of antibiotics; the second one states that
viral infections can never be treated with antibiotics successfully. Consider ad-
ditionally the set R containing the probabilistic constraints containing
(res)[0.05], (res | h)[0.8].
That is, the probability of an antibiotic resistance is 5% if no further information
is given. However, if the patient used antibiotics heavily, the probability increases
to 80%.
Notice that the probabilistic constraints, and hence the representation of the
uncertainty in the knowledge, refer only to the propositional formulas that label
the L-GCIs. In ALCP, the uncertainty of the knowledge is handled through
these propositional formulas as explained next.
A possible world interprets both the axiom language (i.e., the concept and
role names) and the context language (the propositional variables). Intuitively,
it describes a possible context (L-interpretation) together with the relationships
between concepts in that situation (ALC-interpretation).
Definition 5 (possible world). A possible world is a triple I = (∆I , ·I , vI)
where ∆I is a non-empty set (called the domain), vI is an L-interpretation,
and ·I is an interpretation function that maps every concept name A to a set
AI ⊆ ∆I and every role name r to a binary relation rI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I.
The interpretation function ·I is extended to complex concepts as usual in DLs
by letting (¬C)I := ∆I \CI ; (∃r.C)I := {d ∈ ∆I | ∃e ∈ ∆I .(d, e) ∈ rI , e ∈ CI};
and (C ⊓D)I := CI ∩DI . A possible world is a model of an L-GCI iff it satisfies
the description logic constraint of the axiom whenever it satisfies the context.
Definition 6 (model of TBox). The possible world I = (∆I , ·I , vI) is a
model of the L-GCI 〈C ⊑ D : κ〉, denoted as I |= 〈C ⊑ D : κ〉, iff (i) vI 6|= κ, or
(ii) CI ⊆ DI . It is a model of the L-TBox T iff it is a model of all the L-GCIs
in T .
The classical DL ALC is a special case of ALCP where all the axioms are anno-
tated with an L-tautology ⊤. To preserve the syntax of classical DLs, we denote
such L-GCIs as C ⊑ D instead of 〈C ⊑ D : ⊤〉. In this case, the condition (i)
from Definition 6 cannot be satisfied, and hence a model is required to satisfy
CI ⊆ DI for all L-GCIs C ⊑ D in the TBox. For a deeper introduction to
classical ALC, see [1].
According to our semantics, we only demand that the L-GCIs are satisfied
in some specific contexts. Thus, it is often useful to focus on the classical ALC
TBox that contains the knowledge that holds in a particular situation. For a KB
K = (R, T ) and v ∈ Int(L), the v-restricted TBox is the ALC TBox
Tv := {C ⊑ D | 〈C ⊑ D : κ〉 ∈ T , v |= κ}.
The possible world I satisfies Tv (I |= Tv) if for all L-GCIs C ⊑ D ∈ Tv it
holds that CI ⊆ DI . In the following, we will often consider subsumption and
strong non-subsumption between concepts w.r.t. a restricted TBox. We say that
C is subsumed by D w.r.t. Tv (Tv |= C ⊑ D) if for every I |= Tv it holds that
CI ⊆ DI . Dually, C is strongly non-subsumed byD w.r.t. Tv (Tv |= C 6 6⊑ D) if for
every I |= Tv, CI 6⊆ DI holds. Notice that strong non-subsumption requires that
the inclusion between axioms does not hold in any possible world satisfying Tv.
Hence, this condition is more strict than just negating the subsumption relation.
We now describe how the probabilistic constraints are handled in our logic.
An ALCP-interpretation consists of a finite set of possible worlds and a proba-
bility function over these worlds.
Definition 7 (ALCP-interpretation). An ALCP-interpretation is a pair of
the form P = (I, PI), where I is a non-empty, finite set of possible worlds and
PI is a probability distribution over I.
Each ALCP-interpretation induces a probability distribution over L. The prob-
ability of a context can be obtained by adding the probabilities of all possible
worlds in which this context holds.
Definition 8 (distribution induced by P). Let P = (I, PI) be an ALCP-in-
terpretation. The probability distribution PP : Int(L) → [0, 1] induced by P is
defined by PP(v) :=
∑
I∈I|v
PI(I), where I|v = {(∆I , ·I , vI) ∈ I | vI = v}.
As usual, reasoning is restricted to interpretations that satisfy the restrictions
imposed by the knowledge base. In our case, we have to demand that the in-
terpretation is consistent with both the classical and the probabilistic part of
our knowledge base. That is, we consider only those possible worlds that satisfy
both the terminological knowledge (T ) and the probabilistic constraints (R).
Definition 9 (model). Let P = (I, PI) be an ALCP-interpretation. P is con-
sistent with the TBox T if every I ∈ I is a model of T . P is consistent with the
set of probabilistic constraints R iff PP |= R. The ALCP-interpretation P is a
model of the KB K = (R, T ) iff it is consistent with both T and R. As usual, a
KB is consistent iff it has a model.
Notice that ALCP-KBs can express both, logical and probabilistic dependencies
between axioms. For instance, two L-GCIs 〈C1 ⊑ D1 : κ1〉 and 〈C2 ⊑ D2 : κ2〉
where κ1 ⇒ κ2 express that whenever the first L-GCI is satisfied, the second
one must also hold. Similarly, the probabilistic dependencies between axioms are
expressed via the probabilistic constraints of the labeling formulas.
We are interested in computing degrees of belief for subsumption relations
between concepts. We define the conditional probability of a subsumption rela-
tion given a context with respect to a given ALCP-interpretation following the
usual notions of conditioning.
Definition 10 (probability of subsumption). Let C,D be concepts, κ a con-
text and P an ALCP-interpretation. The conditional probability of C ⊑ D given
κ with respect to P is
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) :=
∑
I∈I,I|=κ,I|=C⊑DPI(I)∑
I∈I,I|=κPI(I)
. (3)
Notice that the denominator in (3) can be rewritten as∑
I∈I,I|=κ
PI(I) =
∑
v|=κ
∑
I∈I|v
PI(I) =
∑
v|=κ
PP(v) = PP(κ).
As usual, the conditional probability is only well-defined when PP(κ) > 0.
Recall that the set of probabilistic constraints R may be satisfied by an
infinite class of probability distributions. In the spirit of maximum entropy rea-
soning, we consider only the most conservative ones in the sense that they induce
the ME-model PMER of R.
Definition 11 (ME-ALCP-model). An ALCP-model P of K is called an
ME-ALCP-model of K iff PP = PMER . The set of all ME-ALCP-models of K is
denoted by ModME(K). K is called ME-consistent iff ModME(K) 6= ∅.
Note that ME-consistency is a strictly stronger notion of consistency. ME-consis-
tent knowledge bases are always consistent, but the converse does not necessarily
hold if the classical TBox obtained from T by restricting to a context is incon-
sistent as we show in the following example.
Example 12. Let sig(L) = {x} and K = (R, T ) be the KB with R = ∅ and
T = {〈A ⊔ ¬A ⊑ A ⊓ ¬A : x〉}. Since A ⊔ ¬A ⊑ A ⊓ ¬A is contradictorial, each
ALCP-model of K must satisfy ¬x. There certainly are such models, but in each
such model P , PP(x) = 0. However, since R = ∅, we have PMER (x) = 0.5 and
hence K has no ME-model.
ME-inconsistency rules out some undesired cases in which the whole knowledge
base is consistent, but the TBox restricted to some context is inconsistent. The
following theorem gives a simple characterization of ME-consistency: to verify
ME-consistency of a KB, it suffices to check consistency of the TBoxes induced
by the L-interpretations that have positive probability with respect to PMER . By
the properties of the ME distribution, these are the interpretations that are not
explicitly restricted to have zero probability through R.
Theorem 13. The KB K = (R, T ) is ME-consistent iff for every v ∈ Int(L)
such that PMER (v) > 0, Tv is consistent.
For the rest of this paper we consider only ME-consistent KBs. Hence, whenever
we speak of a KB K, we implicitly assume that K has at least one ME-model.
We are interested in computing the probability of a subsumption relation
w.r.t. a given KB K. Notice that, although we consider only one probability dis-
tribution PMER , there can still exist many different ME-models of K, which yield
different probabilities for the same subsumption relation. One way to handle
this is to consider the smallest and largest probabilities that can be consistently
associated to this relation. We call them the sceptical and the creduluos degrees
of belief, respectively.
Definition 14 (degree of belief). Let C,D be ALCP concepts, κ a context,
and K = (R, T ) an ALCP KB. The sceptical degree of belief of C ⊑ D given κ
w.r.t. K is
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) := inf
P∈ModME(K)
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ).
The credulous degree of belief of C ⊑ D given κ w.r.t. K is
BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) := sup
P∈ModME(K)
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ).
Example 15. Consider Kexa from Example 4. If we ask for the degrees of belief
that a patient who suffers from an infection can be successfully treated with
antibiotics, we obtain
BsKexa(∃sf.inf ⊑ ∃suc.ab | ⊤) = 0,
BcKexa(∃sf.inf ⊑ ∃suc.ab | ⊤) = 1.
These bounds are not very informative, but they are perfectly justified by our
knowledge base since we do not know anything about the effectiveness of an-
tibiotics with respect to infections in general. However, for a patient who suffers
from a streptococcal infection we get
BsKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | ⊤) = 0.9405,
BcKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | ⊤) = 0.95.
If we know that this patient used antibiotics heavily in the past, then there
is nothing in our knowledge base that guarantees the existence of a successful
treatment. Hence, the degrees of belief become
BsKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | h) = 0
BcKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | h) = 0.2.
Our definition of the sceptical degree of belief raises a philosophical question:
should there be no difference between the degree of belief 0 and an infinitely
small degree of belief? A dual question arises for the credulous degree of belief
and the probability 1. However, as we show in the next section, the sceptical and
credulous degrees of belief actually correspond to minimum and maximum rather
than to infimum and supremum (see Corollary 30) so that these questions become
vacuous. From the following theorem we can conclude that every intermediate
degree can also be obtained by some model of the KB.
Theorem 16 (Intermediate Value Theorem). Let p1 < p2 and P1 and P2
be two ME-ALCP-models of the KB K = (R, T ) such that PrP1(C ⊑ D | κ) = p1
and PrP2(C ⊑ D | κ) = p2. Then for each p between p1 and p2 there exists an
ME-ALCP-model P of K such that PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) = p
As we will show in Corollary 30, both the sceptical degree BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) and
the credulous degree BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) are in fact witnessed by some ME-models.
Therefore it is meaningful to consider the whole interval of beliefs between
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) and B
c
K(C ⊑ D | κ).
Definition 17 (belief interval). Let C,D be ALCP concepts, κ ∈ L a context
and K = (R, T ) a ALCP KB. The belief interval for C ⊑ D w.r.t. K given κ is
BK(C ⊑ D | κ) := [B
s
K(C ⊑ D | κ),B
c
K(C ⊑ D | κ)].
4 Computing Beliefs
In this section we show how to compute the belief interval. The first theorem
states that the sceptical degreef of belief for a subsumption relation can be
computed by adding the probabilities of those L-interpretations w that entail
this subsumption in the corresponding restricted TBox Tw.
Theorem 18. Let K = (R, T ) be a KB, C,D two concepts, and κ a context
such that PMER (κ) > 0. Then
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) =
∑
w∈Int(L),Tw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w)
PMER (κ)
.
Dually, the credulous degree of belief for a subsumption relation can be computed
by removing all the situations in which this relation cannot possibly hold.
Theorem 19. Let K = (R, T ) be a KB, C,D two concepts, and κ a context
with PMER (κ) > 0. Then
BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) = 1−
∑
w∈Int(L),Tw|=C 6 6⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w)
PMER (κ)
.
To prove these theorems, one can build two models of the KB K, P and Q such
that PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) and PrQ(C ⊑ D | κ) are those degrees expressed by
Theorems 18 and 19, respectively. As a byproduct of these proofs, we obtain
that the infimum and supremum that define the sceptical and the credulous
degrees of belief actually correspond to minimum and maximum taken by some
ME-models, yielding the following corollary.
Corollary 20. Let K be an ALCP KB, C,D be two concepts, and κ be a context.
There exist two ME-models P,Q of K with BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrP (C ⊑ D | κ)
and BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrQ(C ⊑ D | κ).
The direct consequence of Theorems 18 and 19 is that if we want to compute
the belief interval for C ⊑ D given some context, it suffices to identify all
L-interpretations whose induced (classical) TBoxes entail the subsumption rela-
tion C ⊑ D (for the sceptical belief) or the strong non-subsumption C 6 6⊑ D (for
credulous belief). Recall that every set of propositional interpretations can be
represented by a propositional formula. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 21 (consequence formula). An L-formula φ is a consequence
formula for C ⊑ D (respectively C 6 6⊑ D) w.r.t. the L-TBox T if for every
w ∈ Int(L) it holds that w |= φ iff Tw |= C ⊑ D (respectively Tw |= C 6 6⊑ D).
If we are able to compute these consequence formulas, then the computation of
the belief interval can be reduced to the evaluation of the probability of these
formulas w.r.t. the ME-distribution satisfying R.
Theorem 22. Let K = (R, T ) be an ALCP KB, φ and ψ be consequence for-
mulas for C ⊑ D and C 6 6⊑ D w.r.t. T , respectively, and κ a context. Then
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) = P
ME
R (φ | κ) and B
c
K(C ⊑ D | κ) = 1− P
ME
R (ψ | κ).
Algorithm 1 Computing degrees of belief
Input: KB K = (R, T ), concepts C,D, context κ
Output: Belief degrees
(
BsK(C ⊑ D|κ), B
c
K(C ⊑ D|κ)
)
ℓs ← 0; ℓc ← 0
for all v ∈ Int(L) do
if v |= κ then
if Tv |= C ⊑ D then
ℓs ← ℓs + P
ME
R (v)
else if Tv |= C 6 6⊑ D then
ℓc ← ℓc + P
ME
R (v)
return
(
ℓs/P
ME
R (κ), 1− ℓc/P
ME
R (κ)
)
Example 23. In our running example, one can see that a consequence formula
for ∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab is ¬res ∧ ¬h. Indeed, in order to deduce this consequence
it is necessary to satisfy the first axiom of Texa, which is only guaranteed in the
context ¬res∧¬h. Similarly, res is a consequence formula for ∃sf.strep 6 6⊑ ∃suc.ab.
Knowing both the consequence formulas and the ME-model, we can deduce
BsKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | ⊤) = P
ME
R (¬res ∧ ¬h) = 0.9405
and
BcKexa(∃sf.strep ⊑ ∃suc.ab | h) = 1− P
ME
R (res | h) = 0.2.
In particular, Theorem 22 implies that the belief interval can be computed in
two phases. The first phase uses purely logical reasoning to compute the con-
sequence formulas, while the second phase applies probabilistic inferences to
compute the degrees of belief from these formulas. We now briefly explain how
the consequence formulas can be computed.
Notice first that subsumption and non-subsumption are monotonic conse-
quences in the sense of [2]; that is, if an ALC TBox T entails the subsumption
C ⊑ D, then every superset of T also entails this consequence. Similarly, adding
more axioms to a TBox entailing C 6 6⊑ D does not remove this entailment. More-
over, the set of all L-formulas (modulo logical equivalence) forms a distributive
lattice ordered by generality, in which L-interpretations are all the join prime
elements. Thus, the consequence formulas from Definition 21 are in fact the so-
called boundaries from [2]. Hence, they can be computed using any of the known
boundary computation approaches.
Assuming that the number of contexts is small in comparison to the size of
the TBox, it is better to compute the degrees of belief through a more direct
approach following Theorems 18 and 19. In order to compute BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) and
BcK(C ⊑ D | κ), it suffices to enumerate all interpretations v ∈ Int(L) and check
whether Tv |= C ⊑ D or Tv |= C 6 6⊑ D, and v |= κ, or not (see Algorithm 1). This
approach requires 2|sig(L)| calls to a standard ALC reasoner, and each of these
calls runs in exponential time on |T | [9]. Notice that this algorithm has an any-
time behaviour: it is possible to stop its execution at any moment and obtain an
approximation of the belief interval. Moreover, the longer the algorithm runs,
the better this approximation becomes. Thus, this method is adequate for a
system where finding good approximations efficiently may be more important
than computing the precise answers.
5 Properties
We now investigate some properties of probabilistic logics [22]. First we show
that ALCP is language and representation invariant. Invariance is meant with
respect to logical objects. Language invariance means that just extending the
language without changing the knowledge base should not affect reasoning re-
sults. Representation invariance means that equivalent knowledge bases should
yield equal inference results. Notice that different notions of representation de-
pendence exist in the literature. For instance, in [11] a very different notion is
considered, where the language and the knowledge base are changed simultane-
ously. This case is not covered by our notion of representation invariance. ALCP
also satisfies an independence property; i.e., reasoning results about a part of the
language are not changed, when we add knowledge about an independent part
of the language. Finally, ALCP is continuous in the sense that minor changes in
the probabilistic knowledge expressed by a knowledge base cannot induce major
changes in the reasoning results.
Theorem 24 (Representation invariance). Let Ki = (Ri, Ti), i ∈ {1, 2}, be
two KBs such that Mod(R1) = Mod(R2) and Mod(T1) = Mod(T2). Then for all
concepts C,D and contexts κ ∈ L, BK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = BK2(C ⊑ D | κ).
ALCP is not only representation invariant, but also language invariant. This
property is of computational interest, in particular in combination with inde-
pendence, that we investigate subsequently. To illustrate this, suppose that we
added knowledge about bone fractures in our medical example, which is inde-
pendent of the knowledge about infections. Independence guarantees that we
can ignore the knowledge about infections when answering queries about bone
fractures. In this way, we can decrease the size of the knowledge base. Language
invariance guarantees that we can also ignore the concepts, relations and propo-
sitional variables related to the infection domain. Thus, we can decrease the
size of the language. Exploiting both properties, the size of the computational
problems can sometimes be decreased significantly.
Theorem 25 (Language Invariance). Let K1,K2 be KBs over L1,N1C,N
1
R and
L2,N2C,N
2
R, respectively. If K1 = K2, L
1 ⊆ L2,N1C ⊆ N
2
C and N
1
R ⊆ N
2
R, then for
all concepts C,D ∈ N1C and contexts κ ∈ L
1, it holds that
BK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = BK2(C ⊑ D | κ).
For an L-TBox T , we define the signature of T to be the set sig(T ) of all
concept names and role names appearing in T . Likewise, sig(R) is the set of all
propositional variables appearing in R. The signature of a KB K = (R, T ) is
sig(K) := sig(R) ∪ sig(T ).
Theorem 26 (Independence). Let K1,K2 be s.t. sig(K1)∩ sig(K2) = ∅, C,D
be two concepts, and κ a context where (sig(C) ∪ sig(D) ∪ sig(κ)) ∩ sig(K2) = ∅.
Then B(C ⊑K1 D | κ) = B(C ⊑K1∪K2 D | κ).
The last property we consider is continuity. One important practical feature
of continuous probabilistic logics is that they guarantee a numerically stable
behaviour. That is, minor rounding errors due to floating-point arithmetic will
not result in major errors in the computed probabilities. As demonstrated by
Paris in [22], measuring the difference between probabilistic knowledge bases
is subtle and is best addressed by comparing knowledge bases extensionally;
i.e., with respect to their model sets. To this end, Paris considered the Blaschke
metric. Formally, the Blaschke distance ‖S1, S2‖B between two convex sets S1, S2
is defined by
inf{δ ∈ R | ∀P1 ∈ S1∃P2 ∈ S2 : ‖P1, P2‖2 ≤ δ and
∀P2 ∈ S2∃P1 ∈ S1 : ‖P2, P1‖2 ≤ δ}
Intuitively, ‖S1, S2‖B is the smallest real number d such that for each distribu-
tion in one of the sets, there is a probability distribution in the other that has
distance at most d to the former. We say that a sequence of knowledge bases (Ki)
converges to a knowledge base K iff the classical part of each Ki is equivalent to
the classical part of K and the probabilistic part converges to the probabilistic
part of K. Our reasoning approach behaves indeed continuously with respect to
this metric.
Theorem 27 (Continuity). Let (Ki) be a convergent sequence of KBs with
limit K and BKi(C ⊑ D | κ) = [ℓi, ui]. If BK(C ⊑ D | κ) = [ℓ, u], then (li)
converges to ℓ and (ui) converges to u (with respect to the usual topology on R).
6 Related Work
Relational probabilistic logical approaches can be roughly divided into those that
consider probability distributions over the domain, those that consider proba-
bility distributions over possible worlds and those that combine both ideas [10].
Our framework belongs to the second group. Maximum entropy reasoning in
propositional probabilistic logics has been discussed extensively, e.g., in [13,22],
and various extensions to first-order languages have been considered in recent
years [3, 4, 14, 15]. In these works, the domain is restricted to a finite number of
constants or bounded in the limit. We circumvent the need to do so by combin-
ing a classical first-order logic with unbounded domain with a probabilistic logic
with fixed domain.
Many probabilistic DLs have also been considered in the last decades [16,
18, 19]. Our approach is closest to Bayesian DLs [5, 6] and disponte [25]. The
greatest difference with the former lies in the fact that ALCP KBs do not re-
quire a complete specification of the probability distribution, but only a set
of probabilistic constraints. Moreover, the previous formalisms consider only the
sceptical degree of belief, while we are interested in the full belief interval. In con-
trast to disponte, ALCP is capable of expressing both, logical and probabilistic
dependencies between the axioms in a KB; in addition, disponte requires all
uncertainty degrees to be assigned as mutually independent point probabilities,
while ALCP allows for a more flexible specification.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced the probabilistic DL ALCP, which extends the classical DL
ALC with the capability of expressing and reasoning about uncertain contextual
knowledge defined through the principle of maximum entropy. Effective reason-
ing methods were developed using the decoupling between the logical and the
probabilistic components of ALCP KBs. We also studied the properties of this
logic in relation to other probabilistic logics.
We plan to extend this work in several directions. First, instead of considering
the ME-model, we could reason over all probability distributions that satisfy our
probabilistic constraints similar to [12, 17, 20]. This will result in larger belief
intervals in general. A smaller interval is preferable since it corresponds to a
more precise degree of belief. However, when using all probability distributions
the size of the interval can be a good indicator for the variation of the possible
beliefs in our query with respect to the knowledge base.
In some applications it is also useful to allow more expressive propositional
or relational context languages like those proposed in [4, 7, 15, 23]. Similarly,
we can consider other DLs for our concept language. Indeed, ALC was chosen
as a prototypical DL for studying the basic properties of our framework. In-
cluding additional constructors into the formalism should be relatively simple.
In contrast, considering other reasoning problems beyond subsumption is less
straightforward. Recall, for instance, that if an ALCP KB K contains an incon-
sistent context with positive probability, then K has no models. It is thus unclear
how to handle the probability of consistency of a KB.
Practical reasoning with ALCP can be currently performed by combining ex-
isting ME-reasoners3 with any ALC-reasoner4 according to Algorithm 1. Clearly,
such an approach can still be further optimized. We are working on combining
the classical and probabilistic reasoning parts in more sophisticated ways.
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Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 13. The KB K = (R, T ) is ME-consistent iff for every v ∈ Int(L)
such that PMER (v) > 0, Tv is consistent.
Proof. For the “if” direction, let v1, . . . , vn ∈ Int(L) be all the L-interpretations
such that PMER (vi) > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n the induced
TBox Tvi has a classical model Ii = (∆
Ii , ·Ii), by assumption. It is easy to verify
that the ALCP-interpretation P = (I, PI) defined by
I = {Ji = (∆
Ii , ·Ii , vi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
and PI(Ji) = PMER (vi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is an ME-model of K. Thus, K is
consistent.
Conversely, let P = (I, PI) be an ME-model of K. Then, for every v ∈ Int(L)
with PMER (v) > 0 there is a possible world (∆
I , ·I ,wI) with wI = v. Since I is a
model of T and satisfies all contexts corresponding to the GCIs in Tv, it follows
that (∆I , ·I) |= Tv; thus, Tv must be consistent. ⊓⊔
Theorem 16 (Intermediate Value Theorem). Let p1 < p2 and P1 and P2
be two ME-ALCP-models of the KB K = (R, T ) such that PrP1(C ⊑ D | κ) = p1
and PrP2(C ⊑ D | κ) = p2. Then for each p between p1 and p2 there exists an
ME-ALCP-model P of K such that PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) = p
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that Pi = (Ii, Pi), i = 1, 2, are such that I1 ∩ I2 = ∅: if
there exists some I ∈ I1 ∩ I2, it suffices to rename the elements in ∆I in one
of the probabilistic interpretations. Given λ ∈ [0, 1], define Pλ = (I1 ∪ I2, Pλ),
where for every I ∈ I1 ∪ I2,
Pλ(I) =
{
(1− λ)P1(I) if I ∈ I1
λP2(I) otherwise.
Pλ is consistent with T since P1,P2 are. We now show that Pλ induces the
ME-model of R, which implies that Pλ is an ME-ALCP-model of K. For all
v ∈ Int(L), we have
PPλ(v) =
∑
I∈(I1∪I2)|v
Pλ(I)
=
∑
I∈I1|v
Pλ(I) +
∑
I∈I2|v
Pλ(I)
=
∑
I∈I1|v
(1 − λ) · P1(I) +
∑
I∈I2|v
λ · P2(I)
= (1− λ) · PP1(v) + λ · PP2(v) = PMER (v),
where the last equation follows from PP1 = PP2 = PMER . Hence, each Pλ is
indeed a ME-ALCP-model of K. For the probability of our subsumption relation,
we can derive similarly that PPλ(κ)PrPλ(C ⊑ D | κ) is equal to∑
I∈I1∪I2,
I|=κ,I|=C⊑D
Pλ(I) =
∑
I∈I1,
I|=κ,I|=C⊑D
Pλ(I) +
∑
I∈I2,
I|=κ,I|=C⊑D
Pλ(I)
= PPλ(κ) ((1− λ)p1 + λp2) .
For every p ∈ [p1, p2] there exists a λp ∈ [0, 1] such that p = (1 − λp)p1 + λpp2.
Using this value λp we obtain that PrPλp (C ⊑ D | κ) = p ⊓⊔
In order to prove Theorems 18 and 19 it is useful to consider a restricted class
of ALCP-interpretations in which each context is represented by at most one
possible world. We call these interpretations pithy.
Definition 28 (pithy). The ALCP-interpretation P=(I, PI) is pithy if for
every w ∈ Int(L) there is at most one possible world (∆I , ·I , vI) ∈ I with vI = w.
As the following lemma shows, pithy models are sufficient for computing the
sceptical and credulous degrees of belief of a conditional subsumption relation
and, by extension, the belief interval.
Lemma 29. Let K be an ALCP KB, C,D two concepts and κ ∈ L such that
PMER (κ) > 0. For every ALCP-model P of K there exist pithy ALCP-models
Q1,Q2 of K such that
PrQ1(C ⊑ D | κ)≤PrP(C ⊑ D | κ)≤PrQ2(C ⊑ D | κ)
and PP = PQ1 = PQ2 .
Proof. Let P = (I, PI). If P is already pithy, then the result holds trivially.
Otherwise, there must exist two possible worlds I,J ∈ I such that vI = vJ .
There are four possible cases: (i) I |= C ⊑ D and J |= C ⊑ D; (ii) I 6|= C ⊑ D
and J 6|= C ⊑ D; (iii) I |= C ⊑ D and J 6|= C ⊑ D; and (iv) I 6|= C ⊑ D and
J |= C ⊑ D.
We construct a new model P ′ by removing one of the possible worlds I,J
and redistributing the probability according to these cases, as described next.
For the first three cases, define H := I \ {I} and the probability distribution
PH(H) :=
{
PI(H) H 6= J
PI(I) + PI(J ) H = J
for all H ∈ H. Then PP = PP
′
and P ′ = (H, PH) is still an ME-model of K.
Since the denominator in (3) is PMER (κ) independently of C ⊑ D, we have by
construction that
PrP′(C ⊑ D | κ) ≤ PrP(C ⊑ D | κ).
The case (iv) is symmetric to (iii), where the possible world J is removed instead
of I. Since H ⊂ I, we can iteratively repeat this process until a pithy model Q1
is obtained.
Q2 can be constructed symmetrically. ⊓⊔
Notice that since PP = PQ1 = PQ2 , this lemma in particular implies that for
each ME-model there exists a pithy ME-model that yields a smaller or equal
probability for the subsumption relation, and dually one that yields a larger or
equal probability. Note also that in each pithy ME-model, for all w ∈ Int(L)
with PMER (w) > 0, there must be exactly one possible world I with v
I = w
because otherwise PI could not be a probability distribution (the elementary
events could not sum to 1). Moreover, since a pithy interpretation can contain
at most |Int(L)| possible worlds and the world corresponding to some w ∈ Int(L)
must have probability PMER (w), there is only a finite number of probabilities that
pithy models can assign to a given subsumption relation. Hence, the infimum and
supremum that define the sceptical and the credulous degrees of belief actually
correspond to minimum and maximum taken by some pithy ME-models.
Corollary 30. Given an ALCP KB K, two concepts C,D and a context κ, there
exist two pithy ME-models P,Q of K such that BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrP(C ⊑ D | κ)
and BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrQ(C ⊑ D | κ).
Theorem 18. Let K = (R, T ) be a KB, C,D two concepts, and κ a context
such that PMER (κ) > 0. Then
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) =
∑
w∈Int(L),Tw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w)
PMER (κ)
.
Proof. For every w ∈ Int(L), we construct anALCP-interpretation Iw as follows.
If Tw |= C ⊑ D, then Iw is any model (∆Iw , ·Iw , w) of Tw; otherwise, Iw is
any model (∆Iw , ·Iw , w) of Tw that does not satisfy C ⊑ D, which must exist
by definition. Let now PK = (I, PI) be the ALCP-interpretation such that
I = {Iw | w ∈ Int(L)} and PI(Iw) = PME(w) for all w. Then PK is a model of
K. Moreover, it holds that
PrPK(C ⊑ D | κ) =
∑
Iw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PI(Iw)/P
ME
R (κ)
=
∑
Tw|=C⊑D
PMER (w)/P
ME
R (κ).
Thus, PMER (κ)B
s
K(C ⊑ D | κ) ≤
∑
Tw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w). If this inequality is
strict, then w.l.o.g. there must exist a pithy probabilistic model P = (J, PJ) of K
such that PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) < PrPK(C ⊑ D | κ) (see Lemma 29). Hence for every
w ∈ Int(L) with PMER (w) > 0 there exists exactly one Jw ∈ J with v
JW = w.
We thus have ∑
Jw |=C⊑D
PJ(Jw) <
∑
Iw|=C⊑D
PI(Iw).
Since PI(Iw) = PJ(Jw) for all w, then there must exist a valuation v such that
Iv |= C ⊑ D but Jv 6|= C ⊑ D. Since Jv is a model of Tv it follows that
Tv 6|= C ⊑ D. By construction, then we have that Iv 6|= C ⊑ D, which is a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 19. Let K = (R, T ) be a KB, C,D two concepts, and κ a context
with PMER (κ) > 0. Then
BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) = 1−
∑
w∈Int(L),Tw|=C 6 6⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w)
PMER (κ)
.
Proof. For every w ∈ Int(L), construct an ALCP-interpretation Iw as follows.
If Tw |= C 6 6⊑ D, then Iw is any model (∆Iw , ·Iw , w) of Tw; otherwise, Iw is
any model (∆Iw , ·Iw , w) of Tw that satisfies C ⊑ D. Let PK = (I, PI) be the
ALCP-interpretation with I = {Iw | w ∈ Int(L)} and PI(Iw) = PME(w) for all
w. Then PK is a model of K. Moreover, it holds that
PrPK(C ⊑ D | κ) =
∑
Iw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PI(Iw)/P
ME
R (κ)
= 1−
∑
Tw|=A 6⊑B
PMER (w)/P
ME
R (κ).
That is, BcK(C ⊑ D | κ) ≥ 1−
∑
Tw|=C⊑D,w|=k
PMER (w)/P
ME
R (κ). If this inequal-
ity is strict, then there exists a probabilistic model P = (J, PJ) of K such that
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ) > PrPK(C ⊑ D | κ). By Lemma 29, we can assume w.l.o.g.
that P is pithy. Hence for every w ∈ Int(L) with PME(w) > 0 there is exactly
one Jw ∈ J with vJW = w, and thus,∑
Jw |=C⊑D
PJ(Jw) >
∑
Iw|=C⊑D
PI(Iw).
Since PI(Iw) = PJ(Jw) for all w, there must exist some v ∈ Int(L) such that
Iv 6|= C ⊑ D but Jv |= C ⊑ D. As Jv is a model of Tv, Tv 6|= C 6 6⊑ D. By
construction, we have that Iv |= C ⊑ D, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 22. Let K = (R, T ) be an ALCP KB, φ and ψ be consequence for-
mulas for C ⊑ D and C 6 6⊑ D w.r.t. T , respectively, and κ a context. Then
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) = P
ME
R (φ | κ) and B
c
K(C ⊑ D | κ) = 1− P
ME
R (ψ | κ).
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of Definition 21 and Theorems 18
and 19. Indeed,
BsK(C ⊑ D | κ) =
∑
Tw|=C⊑D,w|=κ
PMER (w)/P
ME
R (κ)
=
∑
w|=φ∧κ
PMER (w)/P
ME
R (κ) = P
ME
R (φ | κ).
The case of the credulous degree of belief is analogous. ⊓⊔
Theorem 24 (Representation invariance). Let Ki = (Ri, Ti), i ∈ {1, 2}, be
two KBs such that Mod(R1) = Mod(R2) and Mod(T1) = Mod(T2). Then for all
concepts C,D and contexts κ ∈ L, BK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = BK2(C ⊑ D | κ).
Proof. Let P = (I, PI) be an ALCP-interpretation. Since Mod(T1) = Mod(T2),
P is consistent with T1 iff P is consistent with T2. Since Mod(R1) = Mod(R2),
R1 and R2 induce the same ME-model and P1 is (ME-)consistent with R iff P2
is (ME-)consistent with R. Hence,
BsK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = infP∈ModME(K1)
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ)
= inf
P∈ModME(K2)
PrP(C ⊑ D | κ)
= BsK2(C ⊑ D | κ)
Analogously, we get that BcK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = B
c
K2
(C ⊑ D | κ) and therefore
BK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = BK2(C ⊑ D | κ). ⊓⊔
Theorem 25 (Language Invariance). Let K1,K2 be KBs over L
1,N1C,N
1
R and
L2,N2C,N
2
R, respectively. If K1 = K2, L
1 ⊆ L2,N1C ⊆ N
2
C and N
1
R ⊆ N
2
R, then for
all concepts C,D ∈ N1C and contexts κ ∈ L
1, it holds that
BK1(C ⊑ D | κ) = BK2(C ⊑ D | κ).
Proof. It suffices to show that for every ALCP-model P1 of K1 there exists a
ALCP-model P2 of K2 such that PrP1(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrP2(C ⊑ D | κ) and
vice versa. Given an ALCP-model P1 = (I1, PI1) of K1, we build P2 = (I2, PI2)
as follows. For each possible world I ∈ I1 with probability p, I2 contains a
possible world I ′ with probability p that extends I assigning false to all new
propositional variables and the empty set to all new role names and concept
names. Since C,D, κ and K2 depend only on sig(L1),N1C,N
1
R, P2 satisfies K2
and PrP1(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrP2(C ⊑ D | κ) holds. Conversely, consider an
ALCP-model P2 = (I2, PI2) of K2. We obtain P1 from P2 by restricting the
possible worlds in I2 to C,D, κ. As before, it follows that P1 satisfies K1 and
PrP1(C ⊑ D | κ) = PrP2(C ⊑ D | κ). ⊓⊔
In order to prove Independence, we need the following lemma. It states an inde-
pendence property of ME-distributions over our context language.
Lemma 31 (ME-independence). Let R1,R2 be two finite sets of probabil-
ity constraints such that sig(L1) ∩ sig(L2) = ∅, and let R := R1 ∪ R2. Then
PMER = P
ME
1 · P
ME
2 . In particular, for the marginal distributions of P
ME
R , we
have PMER (vi) = P
ME
i (vi) for all vi ∈ Int(Li), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Since the signatures of Li are disjoint, we can denote the valuations of
the language over sig(L1)∪ sig(L2) by (v1, v2), vi ∈ sig(Li). Let us first consider
the marginals of P = PME1 · P
ME
2 . For all v1 ∈ Int(Li), we have
P (v1) =
∑
v2∈Int(Li)
P (v1, v2) = P
ME
1 (v1)
∑
v2∈Int(Li)
PME2 (v2)
= PME1 (v1).
Symmetrically, we can show that P (v2) = P
ME
2 (v2). This means, in particu-
lar, that the marginals of P coincide with the corresponding maximum entropy
solutions. Therefore,
H(P ) =
∑
v1
∑
v2
PME1 (v1)P
ME
2 (v2) log(P
ME
1 (v1)·P
ME
2 (v2))
=
∑
v2
PME2 (v2)
∑
v1
PME1 (v1) logP
ME
1 (v1)
+
∑
v1
PME1 (v1)
∑
v2
PME2 (v2) logP
ME
2 (v2)
= H(PME1 ) +H(P
ME
2 ).
Using the independence bound for entropy (see, e.g., [27], Theorem 2.39), we
have that
H(PMER ) ≤ H(P
ME
1 ) +H(P
ME
2 ) = H(P ).
Hence, it suffices to show that PME1 ·P
ME
2 is indeed a model of R1∪R2. But this
follows immediately from the facts that PMEi satisfies Ri and that the marginal-
ization of P over one logic corresponds to the ME-distribution over the other.
⊓⊔
Theorem 26 (Independence). Let K1,K2 be s.t. sig(K1) ∩ sig(K2) = ∅, C,D
be two concepts, and κ a context where (sig(C) ∪ sig(D) ∪ sig(κ)) ∩ sig(K2) = ∅.
Then B(C ⊑K1 D | κ) = B(C ⊑K1∪K2 D | κ).
Proof. Let Ki = (Ri, Ti) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since the signatures of both KBs are
disjoint, we will denote the valuations over the set of variables sig(R1)∪ sig(R2)
as pairs (w1, w2), where wi is a valuation over sig(Ri). We know from Theorem 18
that
PME(κ)B(C ⊑K1∪K2 D | κ) =
∑
(w1,w2)|=κ
(T1∪T2)(w1,w2)
|=C⊑D
PMER ((w1, w2))
=
∑
(w1,w2)|=κ
(T1)w1 |=C⊑D
PMER ((w1, w2)) (4)
=
∑
w1|=κ
(T1)w1 |=C⊑D
PMER (w1) (5)
= PMER (κ)B(C ⊑K1 D | κ),
where (4) follows from the monotonicity of subsumption in ALC TBoxes, and (5)
is a consequence of Lemma 31. ⊓⊔
In order to prove Continuity, we start with a lemma that states continuity of
ME-distributions over L. The proof is analogous to Paris’ proof of continuity of
maximum entropy reasoning in his probabilistic logic [22], which is a sub-logic
of our probabilistic logic over L.
Lemma 32 (ME-continuity). Let R be a set of probabilistic constraints and
let (Ri) be a sequence of probabilistic constraints such that (Mod(Ri)) con-
verges to Mod(R). Then the sequence (Pi) of ME -Models of Ri converges to
the ME-model PMER of R.
Proof. For brevity, let M = Mod(R) and Mi = Mod(Ri). We show that for each
ǫ > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that ‖Ki,K‖B < δ implies that ‖PMEi , P
ME
R ‖1 < ǫ.
Consider the set S = {P ∈M | ‖P, PMER ‖1 ≥
ǫ
2} of models of of R that have at
least distance ǫ2 to P
ME
R . By continuity of the euclidean distance and compact-
ness of M , S must be compact. Since the entropy function H is continuous, the
minimum ν = min{H(PMER ) −H(P ) | P ∈ S} does exist and ν > 0 by unique
maximality of PMER . Since H is defined on a compact set (the set of probabil-
ity distributions over L), H is uniformly continuous. Therefore there exists a
δ > 0 such that for all distributions P1, P2 over L, ‖P1, P2‖1 < δ implies that
H(P1) −H(P2) < min{
ǫ
2 ,
ν
2}. In partiular, we can assume that δ <
ǫ
2 . Now, if
‖Mi,M‖B < δ, there is a Pi ∈Mi such that ‖Pi, PMER ‖1 < δ and a P ∈M such
that ‖PMEi , P‖1 < δ. Hence,
H(PMER ) < H(Pi) +
ν
2
≤ H(PMEi ) +
ν
2
,
H(PMEi ) < H(P ) +
ν
2
≤ H(PMER ) +
ν
2
and therefore |H(PMEi )−H(P
ME
R )| <
ν
2 . In particular,
|H(P )−H(PMER )|
≤ |H(P )−H(PMEi )|+ |H(P
ME
i )−H(P
ME
R )|
<
ν
2
+
ν
2
= ν.
By definition of ν, we can conclude that P ∈M \S and therefore ‖PMER , P‖1 <
ǫ
2 .
Hence,
‖PMER , P
ME
i ‖1 ≤ ‖P
ME
R , P‖1 + ‖P, P
ME
i ‖1 <
ǫ
2
+ δ < ǫ.
⊓⊔
Theorem 27 (Continuity). Let (Ki) be a convergent sequence of KBs with
limit K and BKi(C ⊑ D | κ) = [ℓi, ui]. If BK(C ⊑ D | κ) = [ℓ, u], then (li)
converges to ℓ and (ui) converges to u (with respect to the usual topology on R).
Proof. Let K = (R, T ) and Ki = (Ri, Ti). By assumption, (Mod(Ri)) converges
to Mod(R). Hence, Lemma 32 implies that the probability distributions induced
by ME-models of Ki converge to PMER , which, in turn, is the probability distri-
bution induced by all ME-models of K. Hence, infimum and supremum of the
conditonal probability of C ⊑ D given κ with respect to Ki will converge to
infimum and supremum with respect to K. ⊓⊔
